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Abstract  
Cloud computing plays an essential role as a source for outsourcing data to perform mining operations or 
other data processing, especially for data owners who do not have sufficient resources or experience to 
execute data mining techniques. However, the privacy of outsourced data is a serious concern. Most data 
owners are using anonymization-based techniques to prevent identity and attribute disclosures to avoid 
privacy leakage before outsourced data for mining over the cloud. In addition, data collection and 
dissemination in a resource-limited network such as sensor cloud require efficient methods to reduce 
privacy leakage. The main issue that caused identity disclosure is Quasi-Identifiers (QIDs) linking. But 
most researchers of anonymization methods ignore the identification of proper QIDs. This reduces the 
validity of the used anonymization methods and may thus lead to a failure of the anonymity process. This 
paper introduces a new quasi-identifier recognition algorithm that reduces identity disclosure resulted 
from QIDs linking. The proposed algorithm is comprised of two main stages: (1) Attributes Classification 
(or QIDs Recognition), and (2) QID's-Dimension Identification. The algorithm works based on the re-
identification of risk rate for all attributes and the dimension of QIDs where it determines the proper QIDs 
and their suitable dimensions. The proposed algorithm was tested on a real dataset. The results 
demonstrated that the proposed algorithm significantly reduces privacy leakage and maintaining the data 
utility compared to recent related algorithms. 
	  
Introduction  
In the modern information age, many companies are using external sources of data for processing, storing, 
or obtaining some services such as data mining. Unlimited computational resources, reduced costs, non-
burden of maintenance, and non-diligence to learn the skills of proficiency in certain services, all of these 
were temptations to advance to the modern change. However, there are still security and privacy concerns 
that hinder the use of the features offered by the cloud [1]. Numerous studies clarified that attackers often 
reveal the information from third-party services or third-party clouds [2]. For example, one of the security 
breaches in October 2014 was a breakthrough for Dropbox. The attackers stole 700 user passwords to 
obtain cash values of its Bitcoins (BTC). In 2015, a lot of users' information, exceeds 4 million, such as 
the user’s name, date of birth, address, e-mail, phone number, and other sensitive data were leaked through 
the TalkTalk service provider in the UK. In 2016, Time Warner one of the largest cable television 
companies in the United States has announced that about 32 million passwords and e-mail of the users 
have been stolen via an attacker. In 2017, more than 200 million data of the users containing users' names, 
phone numbers, e-mail addresses, home addresses, and other data have been disclosed through the API 
of McDelivery Company in India [2]–[4]. A fresh security violation in Google displayed that any 
administrator of the server who has access to the secret information can misuse it easily. The worst 
problem is that administrator of the honest-but-curious server can violate privacy without being 
discovered [5]. 
Three kinds of the disclosure can cause privacy leakage, identity disclosure, attribute disclosure, and 
membership disclosure [6]. In attribute disclosure and identity disclosure, the intruder identifies that the 
tuple of the target individual is found in the released dataset and he aims to acquire some private/sensitive 
data about that individual from the released dataset [7].  Serious issues that lead to identity disclosure are 
Quasi-Identifiers (QIDs) values linking and the attacker's knowledge background. The QIDs are the 
dataset attributes that if each of them is considered separately does not distinguish the individual, but 
when several attributes are combined they can give a distinctive identification of individuals [8]. For 
example, when looking at the attributes of date of birth, gender, and ZIP code together, one can re-
identification the individuals as stated in [9]. Re-identification of the individuals through linking their 
QIDs leads to what are called linking-attacks. Therefore, the careless publication of QIDs will lead to 
leakage of privacy [3].  
One of the popular practices to avoid privacy leakage is anonymization. The anonymization can 
perform via several types of transformations, by removing the values, changing the structure, replacing 
the values by taxonomy, and combine the values. The anonymization-based methods use one or a 
combination of operations to accomplish an optimum level of concealment [10]. A commonly utilized 
privacy criterion of anonymization is k-anonymity has been introduced by Sweeney 2002 [9]. The K- 
Anonymization model aims to make any record in the released dataset that cannot be distinguished from 
at least (K-1) other records [1], [11]. To avoid the linking-attacks K- Anonymization can be used. The 
effective method to determine the real QIDs is the primary issue for privacy-preserving methods based 




methods neglected this issue or just determine QIDs manually, this reduces the validity of the 
anonymization method as well as negatively affects the usefulness of anonymous data [3].  This study 
aims at overcoming the identity disclosure resulting from QIDs linking and reduce the leakage of privacy 
by proposing a QIDs Recognition (QIR) algorithm based on risk rate re-identification. The proposed 
algorithm comprises two main stages: (1) Attributes Classification (or QIDs Recognition), and (2) QID's-
Dimension Identification. The algorithm works based on the re-identification of risk rate for all attributes 
and the dimension of QIDs where it determines the proper QIDs and their suitable dimensions. Figure 1 
shows the causes effect diagram of privacy leakage. The dark boxes in Figure 1 explain the privacy 
leakage causes addressed by the proposed QIDs Recognition (QIR) algorithm in this study. As shown in 
Figure 1, it is essential to properly identify the  QIDs attributes to overcome the identity disclosure to 
reduce the leakage of privacy resulting from QIDs linking. This paper is made up of 5 sections. Section 2 
describes the state-of-art of privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) over the cloud, whereby present 
some of the current methods and algorithms that address the issue of identification QIDs accurately to 
avoid identity disclosure. A detailed description of the proposed algorithm has been provided in Section 
3. Section 4 demonstrates the experimental evaluation, discussion, and comparison with related work. 
Section 5 concludes this work. 
Related Work 
The research of privacy-preserving outsourced data focus on anonymization-based methods [12]–[18], 
cryptographic-based methods [19]–[24], hybrid methods [2], [25]–[27] and methods seek to improve the 
data utility [26], [28], [29]. Some recent studies have demonstrated the privacy requirements of 
incremental datasets [30]–[32], multiple sensitive attributes [33]–[35]. However, most of these studies 
neglected the issue of identification of the right QIDs, despite its importance in the success of the 
anonymity process. Few of these studies have attempted to introduce methods so that identification of the 





















Huang and others [36] introduce a new method that depends on the hyper-graph to finding a group of 
related views and QIDs set. This method maps the group of related views into a hyper-graph and includes 
all paths available between every two nodes instead of finding the group of related views. The weakness 
of this method is that the QIDs group produced may include so many attributes. Further, it has high 
computational complexity resulted from the process of degeneration of the common graph from the hyper-
graph.  
Omer and Mohamad [37] introduce a new method to select a quasi-identifier (QID) to achieve k-
anonymity. Selective and Decompose algorithms depend on nominating multiple attributes as a set, and 
then generate power set P(S) for them. Following that, the distinct values of the power set P(S) elements 
were computed and listed in a table. Finally, the candidate element from the power set is the element with 
the maximum distinct value. The main problem in this method is selecting the primary nominate set of 


























attributes, where the accuracy of the selection depends on the user experience [3]. Furthermore, is 
impractical to generate P(S) if the number of attributes is big (e.g., more than 8). 
 Y. J. Lee and Lee [38] examine the factors and the likelihood of an individual re-identified for 
medical information through inferable QIDs. The QIDs were considered as database variables that enable 
the re-identification of individuals by linking their QIDs with available external information or a specific 
individual. They selected five factors to form QIDs attributes to prevent patient privacy violations. The 
factors were selected based on their influence on the likelihood of re-identification and the possibility of 
inferring it from background knowledge. One of the disadvantages of this study is that the QIDs that can 
be extracted to re-identification patients' records may exceed 5. Besides, the paper focused only on the 
problem of re-identification of patients' records and avoiding leakage of privacy in the medical records, 
lacking a public method that could be used for general data publishing. Bampoulidis and others [8] assume 
that some QIDs are more important than others (i.e. in data mining/analysis) and, therefore, should be 
distorted as little as possible in the anonymization process. They present a tool to address the issue of 
QIDs by utilizing a local recoding algorithm for k-anonymity. The tool outperforms the ARX (data 
anonymization tool) in terms of dataset quality. The major problem with this method is that it depends on 
the user in defining the QIDs attributes, giving priority to each attribute, as the user relies on his personal 
experience in determining the QIDs attributes, which are usually not accurate. 
Kaur and Agrawal [10] study the impact of QIDs on the anonymization process. They gave new ways 
to consider before choosing the quasi-identifiers. The re-identification risks have been examined using 
different QIDs, diverse parameters, and different sizes of a data sample. The results of their work showed 
that when making the variance in selecting the QIDs for anonymization operation, note that the risk of re-
identification increases when the number of QIDs increases, and it decreases when using QIDs that 
contain fewer categories. Although it is good to take into account these observations before starting the 
anonymity process, it should be noted that these observations extracted by the study are not fixed and 
may change from one dataset to another.  
Wong and others [39] do not reveal the complete set of quasi-identifiers (QID) to the data collector 
before and after the data anonymization process. They believed that the QIDs can be both sensitive values 
and identifying values, they allow the respondents/data owners to hide sensitive-QIDs attributes from 
other parties. The first issue with this method is that the QIDs attributes that respondents consider them 
are sensitive may contain data that are very useful in mining or may adversely affect mining outcomes. 
The second issue is if respondents submit inaccurate data, there is no guarantee of the usefulness of the 
results obtained from data analysis.  
Sei and others [40] consider that some QIDs are regarded as sensitive QIDs and they propose novel 
privacy models, namely, (𝑙1, . . . , 𝑙𝑞) − 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 and (𝑡1, . . . , 𝑡𝑞) − 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠, and a method that can 
treat sensitive QIDs. Their proposed method comprises of two algorithms: anonymization and 
reconstruction algorithms that can treat sensitive QIDs. Although this method can perform anonymity 
while preserving the quality of the data, it suffers from the problem of the Wong [39] method, this is 
because there is no effective method to accurately determine which of the QIDs attributes is considered 




Victor and Lopez  [41] offer a (𝑘, 𝑛,𝑚) anonymity method for sensitive/private data based on the k-
anonymity. The graph algorithms were used to perform QIDs and are moreover has been improved by 
selecting similar QIDs based on the composite and derived attributes. The set of QIDs gets from the 
methods in [36], [41] may include too many attributes, which is increases the information loss in models 
based on generalizations like the K-anonymity [3]. 
 
The Proposed QIDs Recognition Algorithm 
There are two main stages involved in the QIDs Recognition algorithm (QIR) to prevent privacy leakage 
of outsourced data. First, classification of the dataset attributes into Quasi-Identifiers (QIDs ), Sensitive 
Attributes (SAs), and Non-Sensitive attributes ( NSs).  That is, each attribute in the dataset is classified 
into one of the aforementioned group (QIDs, SAs, or NSs). In the attributes’ classification (QIDs 
Recognition) stage, the IDs (Identifiers attributes) are usually removed from the dataset by the data owner. 
The Quasi-Identifiers (QIDs) are the attributes that, when linked together, define the individual. For 
example, age, gender, and ZIP. The Sensitive Attributes (SAs) are the attributes that explain 
sensitive/private information about an individual such as medical information, financial records, and 
location. Meanwhile, the Non-Sensitive attributes (NSs) are the other attributes in the dataset that do not 
fall under the previously mentioned categories, as they do not help reidentify the identity of the individual 
for example state and religious attributes. In the basic privacy models (such as k-anonymity [3,8,9,11-
13,18,28], l-diversity [40,52], and t-closeness [34, 53]), the attributes of a dataset were categorized into 
two groups: sensitive and non-sensitive. Meanwhile, most of the recent researchers such as in [3], [42]–
[45] divide the datasets attributes into three types: QID, SA, and NS (not including identifiers) directly.  
Accordingly, the classification of dataset attributes in this study is divided into three types of QID, SA, 
and NS (not including identifiers) with utilizing the same definitional meaning of each category as in the 
previous work in [3], [42]–[45]. 
Second, determine the actual dimension of QIDs that should be used in an anonymization operation that 
will achieve optimum case. If the set of QIDs contains too many attributes, the loss of information caused 
by generalization will be exacerbated. Nonetheless, sometimes the minimal set of QID does not imply the 
most appropriate privacy protection setting because the method does not consider what attributes the 
adversary could potentially have [37]. Therefore, we need a mechanism that determines the appropriate 
dimension of the QIDs to avoid these problems. In the QIDs-Dimension Determining stage, the proposed 
algorithm performs this task. Figure 2 illustrates the general procedure of the two main phases of the QIR 
Algorithm. The following subsections explain these two stages in more detail.  
 
QIDs Recognition stage 
In this stage, the algorithm classifies the attributes depend on the re-identification risk rate for each 




classification. As shown in Figure 2, the attributes classification stage comprises four main activities. 
These activities include (1) data set preprocessing, (2) computing risk rate for all attributes, (3) selecting 
the classification thresholds, and (4) Classify the attributes according to the selected thresholds. 
In the first activity, the dataset is preprocessed which include filling the missing values, fixing the 
inconsistencies in the dataset, and data normalization. Then in the second activity, the risk rate is 
computed according to the g-distinct which is adopted in computing the re-identification risk rate [46]. A 
detailed description of the g-distinct method is presented in the next section. In third activity, the 
classification thresholds were selected based on the maximum and minimum risk of re-identification as 
follows. These thresholds are denoted by β	  and	  α in this study,  α threshold represents the maximum risk 
of re-identification of the individual while β  represents the minimum risk of re-identification. The 
threshold values can be determined by the user or the data owner after calculating the re-identification 
risk for all attributes. Based on percentages of the highest and lowest attributes risk one can choose the α 
value to be less than the highest risk value and choose the β value to be less than the lowest risk value. 
The nature of the data and the degree of importance of each attribute affect the selection of the threshold 
values. So, these thresholds are adjustable and differ from one dataset to another. For instance, let the 
dataset (𝐷)  contains attributes (𝐴>, 𝐴?, … , 𝐴A),	  	   i.e., 𝐷 = 𝐴>, 𝐴?, … , 𝐴A let  
β = 0.05%	  and	  	  α = 30% . Let 𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘HI  be the re-identification risk of attribute 	  𝐴J , and  𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘HI =
35%	  .	  	  As	  𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘HI > α , then the 𝐴J	    is classified as SA. Suppose 𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘HN  and 
𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘HO	  𝑎𝑟𝑒	  23	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  0.01	  respecively, then 𝐴R  is classified as	  𝑄𝐼𝐷	  𝑤 𝑖𝑙𝑒	  𝐴V will be classified as NS, 
respectively. Re-identification risk rate of attribute 𝐴J  computes the degree that makes the records 
distinguished based on this attribute.  Finally, the fourth activity includes classify the attributes according 
to the selected thresholds using rules represented by if-else testaments (see Algorithm 1, Lines 27 – 39). 
In the following subsection, a details description of computing the re-identification risk rate (g-Distinct) 























The g-distinct is adopted in computing the re-identification risk rate [46]. A person or record in any dataset 
is said to be unique if he/she or it has a combination of attributes that is not for someone/record else. The 
person/record is g-distinct if their combination of attributes is matching to g-1 or less than other 
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people/records in the dataset [46]. Thus, uniqueness is the base situation of 1-distinct. In general, g-
distinct is the total of the number of subgroups with 𝑖 individuals, which is computed as:  
	  ℎA 𝑔 = 𝑖
Y
JZ> . 𝑓A 𝑖 	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  
Where 𝑓A 𝑖  refers to the expected number of subgroups with 𝑖 individuals that can be derived 
from a given aggregated group, and 𝑔 represents the whole number of individuals in a subgroup. That is,  
𝑔 is associated with the g-distinct to represents the number of distinguished individuals in the subgroup. 
For example, when we say 3-distinct, it means that three individuals have common QIDs characteristics 
out of the total number of people 𝑔 in the subgroup. The Sum of all g-distinct of individuals in a specific 
attribute represents the Re-identification risk rate that the attribute potential to cause it. We can compute 
the general risk of the whole dataset through equation (2) where 𝑏 is the number of possible subgroups. 
𝑅𝑛
𝑗 𝑔 = 𝑗
𝑛
𝑏1	  −	  𝑛	   𝑏𝑛 − 𝑏 − 1 𝑛 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  
Finally, the attributes classification stage returns the re-identification risk rate for each attribute in the 
dataset. Based on the resulted re-identification risk rates, the dataset attributes are classified to sensitive 
and nom sensitive according to the rate of the re-identification risk for each attribute in addition to 
threshold values	  𝛽, 𝛼. The outcomes of this stage will be as input into the QIDs dimension identification 
stage to determine the dimension of QIDs that suitable to achieve optimal privacy requirements. The 
practical steps of the classification stage are explained by algorithm 1. The lines 2-16 in algorithm 1 are 
to compute the g-distinct for all dataset attributes while lines 18-26 are to calculate the re-identification 
risk rate based on the attributes’ g-distinct. Finally, lines 28-40 addressed the process of attributes 
classification using the re-identification risk rate of each attribute to produce three categories of attributes: 
QIDs, SAs, and NSs. 
 The	   importance	  of	   this	  stage	  of	   the	  proposed	  algorithm	  represented	  by	  algorithm	  1	   is	   that	   it	  
contributes	   to	   reducing	   the	   attribute	   disclosure	   resulting	   from	   linking	   the	   QIDs	   values	   due	   to	   a	  
weakness/failure	  in	  defining	  the	  QID	  characteristics	  correctly.	  This	  contribution	  helps	  in	  minimizing	  the	  






















QIDs-Dimension Identification Stage 
This stage of the algorithm aims to determine the best dimension of QIDs that will achieve optimum 
cases. The optimum case gives high privacy with a high/reasonable percentage of preserving data quality. 
Algorithm 1 Attributes Classification 
Input: Dataset  D, β, α. 
Output: Classified dataset.  
1:    //Compute g-distinct for all dataset tuples for each attribute. 
Dgbccd	   ⟵  g-distinct of the attribute (𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟) 
𝑛 ⟵ attributes domain 
𝑚 ⟵ tuples domain 
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟	  𝜖	  𝑛 
𝑔	  𝜖	  𝑚 
𝑡𝑣	   ⟵ attribute	  value	  of	  a	  specific	  tuple 
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟_𝐷𝑔	  [𝑖][𝑗] 	  = 	  0 
For 𝑖 ∶= 	  1	  	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑛. 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ   do 
 
       For 𝑗: = 	  1	  	  𝑡𝑜	  𝑚. 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ  do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
2:    
3:    
4:    
5:    
6:    
7:    
8:    
9:    
10:   




12:                 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟_𝐷𝑔	  [𝑖][𝑗] 	  = 	  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟_𝐷𝑔	  [𝑖][𝑗] 	  + 𝐷𝑔Hxxy	  (J)	   ;  
13:                  𝑗	   = 	  𝑗	   + 1; 
14:          End 
15:           𝑖	   = 	  𝑖	   + 1; 
16:   end  
17:   //Compute re-identification risk rate for all dataset attributes. 
18:   𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟[𝑖] 	  = 	  0 
19:   Rriskbccd ⟵  re-identification risk rate  of Attr  
20:   For 𝑖 ∶= 	  1	  	  𝑡𝑜	  	  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟_𝐷𝑔	  [𝑖]. 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ    do 
21:            For j:= 1  to m.length   do 
22:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Rriskbccd [i]= Rriskbccd[i ]+Dgbccd	  [][]	   
23:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝑗	   = 	  𝑗	   + 1; 
24:            End 
25:           𝑖	   = 	  𝑖	   + 1; 
26:   End 
27:   //Classified the attributes based on risk rate and threshold values. 
28:   𝑄𝐼𝐷𝑠	  [	  ] 	  = 	  0   
29:   𝑆𝐴𝑠	  	  [	  ] = 0 
30:   𝑁𝑆𝑠	  [	  ] 	  	  = 	  0   
31:   For	  𝑖 ∶= 	  1	  	  𝑡𝑜	  	  	  𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘Hxxy	  [𝑖]	  . 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ   do 
32:           If  (	  𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘Hxxy	  [𝑖]	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝛽)	  ) 
33:                     𝑄𝐼𝐷𝑠	  [𝑖] 	  = 	  	  𝑄𝐼𝐷𝑠	  [	  ] 	  + 	  	   	  𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘Hxxy	  [𝑖]; 
34:            Else  If  (	  𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘Hxxy	  [𝑖]	  𝑖𝑛	  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝛼)	  ) 
35:                       𝑆𝐴𝑠	  	  	  [𝑖] 	  = 	  	  	  	  𝑆𝐴𝑠	  [	  ] 	  + 	  𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘Hxxy	  [𝑖];  
36:            Else   
37:                      𝑁𝑆𝑠	  [𝑖] 	  	  = 	  	  	  	  𝑆𝐴𝑠	  [	  ] 	  + 	  𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘Hxxy	  [𝑖];  
38:              𝑖	   = 	  𝑖	   + 1; 
39:   end 




In other words, it has high Privacy Gain (PG) with high/reasonable Non-uniform entropy (NUE).  
Algorithm 2 describes the implementation steps for this stage. The algorithm takes a sample of data with 
the QID that has the highest re-identification risk rate. Following that, the QIR calculates the PG and NUE 
base on k-anonymity through equations 3 and 4. In the next step, the QIDs number is increased, the PG 











Finally, the algorithm determines the optimum case is that gives high privacy with a high/reasonable 
percentage of preserving data quality. The best QIDs dimension is the QIDs with the optimum case. 
Algorithm 2 provides the executive steps	  of this stage; lines 5-12 implement the anonymization by k-
anonymity on a sample of the dataset. It begins with QID that has the highest re-identification risk rate. 
After that, the algorithm calculates the Privacy Gain (PG) and Non-uniform entropy (NUE) through 
equations 3 and 4. Then, the QIDs number is increased; the PG and NUE have been calculated repeatedly 
until all the QIDs are finished. Lastly, in lines 13-15 the algorithm determines the best QIDs dimension 
(QidD) that achieves the optimum case to be involved in the anonymization process. 
 It was observed in study [3] that in most cases, when the QIDs dimension is large, the data loss 
increases.	  However, when the QID dimension is small, the privacy protection is not applied optimally 
because one cannot know what the actual QIDs an attacker possesses [37]. Therefore, determining an 
appropriate QIDs dimension is important to reduce data loss. 
 
Algorithm 2 QIDs Dimension Identification 
Input:  Dataset sample d,  QIDs [ ], privacy parameter k	  . 
Output:  Optimal Dimension of QIDs.  
1:    𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 ⟵ 	  	  𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑄𝐼𝐷𝑠 
𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷	  𝜖	  𝑄𝐼𝐷𝑠	  [	  ] 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 ⟵ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙	  𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑄𝐼𝐷𝑠 
𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷[	  ] = 0 
For 𝑖 ∶= 	  1	  	  𝑡𝑜	  	  𝑄𝐼𝐷𝑠	  [	  ]. 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ   do 
      	  𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 𝑖 	  = 	  	  𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷[	  ] + 	  	  𝑄𝐼𝐷𝑠	  [𝑖]; 
2:    
3:    
4:    
5:    
6:    
7:           𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑_𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎	  [𝑖] 	  = 	  𝑘 − 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑑, 𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 𝑖 , 𝑘); 
8:            𝑃𝐺	  [𝑖] = 	  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦_𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛(	  𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑_𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎	  [𝑖]); 
9:            NUE [i] = Non-Uniform_Entroy ( Anonymized_data [i]); 
10:           𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	  [𝑖] 	  = 	  	  	  𝑃𝐺	  [𝑖] 	  − 	  	  𝐸𝐼𝐿	  [𝑖]; 
11:           𝑖	   = 	  𝑖	   + 1; 
12:   end  
13:    If  ((	  	  𝑃𝐺	  [	  ] 	  == 	  𝒎𝒂𝒙)	  &&	  	  	  (𝑁𝑈𝐸	  [	  ] 	  == 	  𝒎𝒂𝒙)) 
14:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷	  [	  ] 	  = 	  	  𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷[𝑖]; 





Performance Measures  
Two performance evaluation measures were used in this study: the Privacy Gain (PG) and the Non-
Uniform Entropy (NUE). More explanation and the derivation of these measures are presented in the 
following sub-sections. 	  
The Privacy Gain 
To evaluate the privacy level for the proposed algorithm, Equation 3 and Definition 1 are used as follows. 
𝑃𝐺 = 	  𝐴x YA 	  𝐴 YA   
Where 𝐴x YA 	  	  is anonymity after generalization (gen), and A   is anonymity before generalization 
[27], [47], [48]. 
Definition (1) Anonymity quasi-identifier: A quasi-identifier 𝑞𝑖𝑑	  is an anonymity quasi-identifier if 
𝑄𝐼𝐺(𝑞𝑖𝑑) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛J’	  ∈	   𝑄𝐼𝐺(𝑞𝑖𝑑′) , where 	    represents the size of a QI-group [48]. 
Non-Uniform Entropy  
In the context of data de-identification, the Non-Uniform entropy is to compare the frequencies of attribute 
values in the transformed dataset according to frequencies in the input dataset; it was originally introduced 
as a model for measuring the loss of information [49]. When a dataset D is transformed into another 
dataset 𝐷′, Non-Uniform entropy is defined as: 
 	  






Experimental Evaluation  
In this section, the experimental evaluation of our implementation algorithm will be presented in terms of 
PG and NUE. In the Dataset Setup subsection, we describe the datasets we have used for running the 
experiments and the experimental environment setup. In the experimental results subsection, we present 
the first set of experiments and provide the results from our algorithm. In the performance benchmark and 
discussion subsection, we provide benchmark and discussion results of our algorithm against a close 







Dataset Setup  
Two real-life datasets from the University of California – Irvine were used in this study to demonstrate 
the performance of the proposed algorithms. The first is the Bank Direct Marketing dataset [50]. The bank 
dataset consists of 17 attributes and 45,211 tuples and does not include any missing values. The dataset 
attributes are divided into three divisions are 1) Data of bank clients: age, job, marital, education, default, 
balance, housing, and loan.  In this paper, we will consider these attributes because these attributes are 
significant for bank clients and re-identification purposes. 2) Data related to the last contact of the current 
campaign. 3) Other attributes like the campaign and days. The second dataset is the Adult dataset [51] 
uses as a standard for anonymization algorithms evaluation [8] consist of 48842 census records and 15 
attributes. 
ARX data anonymization software is open source introduced and developed by Fabian Prasser et al. 
[52] for data anonymization, we used it to implement the algorithms as explained in the following 
sections. The experiments were executed on a machine with an Intel Core i7 2.7 GHz processor with 8 
GB RAM, under Windows 10.   
Experimental Results  
The first experiment is to classify the datasets' attributes according to their risk rate. Figures 3 and 4 
































For the Bank dataset, we identify 𝛼	  	   and 𝛽  as	   𝛼 = 30, 𝛽 = 0. Table 1 demonstrates Bank attributes 
classification. In the Adult dataset, we add 𝛼 = 0.2, 𝛽 = 0.01	   to classify the attributes.  Table 2 
demonstrates the classification of the adult dataset. Because the “Balance” attribute has a risk is 52.04 %, 
which is large comparing to other attributes,  it is excluded from  Figure 3 to highlight the difference 
between the attributes that have relatively small risk values.  
After calculating the risk rate of each attribute in the dataset, the attribute is classified according to the 
selected threshold 𝛼	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝛽 as was explained in the QIDs Recognition stage section. Table 1 and Table 2 
show the classification results of the Bank dataset and Adult dataset, respectively, according to the selected 
classification thresholds 𝛼	  𝑎𝑛𝑑	  𝛽	  for each dataset. After the classification stage,  the best dimension of 
QIDs that achieve optimum case should be determined. In the Bank dataset, the QIDs Dimension(𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷) 
is four (𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 = 4) while in the Adult dataset 𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 is 10 (𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 = 10). For each dataset, the initial value 
of  QID's Dimension is set to one (𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 = 1)	   to be used as input into the proposed QIDs-Dimension 
Identification algorithm (as explained in Algorithm 2). Identification of QIDs-Dimension begins with the 
initial value of 𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷	  and it is incremented until the maximum number of QID's Dimension. Identification 
of QIDs-Dimension begins also with a sample size equal to 10% of the dataset with k-anonymity of 5 and 
it is incriminated until K=25 for each 𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷  value (sample size is changeable).  Then, the privacy gain 
(PG) and the Non-Uniform entropy (NUE) are calculated for each sample and each new 𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 until 𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 











Classification Threshold value 
𝛼 = 30, 𝛽 = 0 
Attributes 
SAs  Rrisk > 	  α Balance. 
QIDs β ≤ Rrisk < α Age, Job, Education, and Marital. 






Finally, the proposed algorithm returns the 𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷	  that achieves the optimum case to be as best dimension 
will be used in the anonymization process. Table 3 demonstrates the results of finding the best  𝑄𝑖𝑑𝐷 for 













Classification Threshold value 
𝛼 = 0.2, 𝛽 = 0.01 
Attributes 
SAs 𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 > 𝛼 Capital-gain, Capital-loss. 
QIDs 𝛽 ≤ 𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 < 𝛼 Hours-per-week, Work-class, Age, Native-
country, Education, Education-num, Occupation, 
Marital-status, Relationship, and Race. 
NSs 𝑅𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 < 𝛽 Sex, Income. 
QID value 
K = 5 K = 15 K = 25 
PG % NUE % PG % NUE % PG % NUE % 
1 33.8 30.41 38.35 21.05 38.35 21.05 
2 55.34 44.65 76.86 23.13 76.86 23.13 
3 77.94 22.05 83.17 16.82 83.17 16.82 
4 79.53 20.46 84.39 15.6 84.39 15.6 
5 83.62 16.37 87.48 12.51 87.48 12.51 
6 85.91 14.08 89.56 10.43 89.56 10.43 
7 86.65 13.34 86.65 13.34 89.69 10.3 
8 90.51 9.48 90.51 9.48 90.51 9.48 
9 92.68 7.31 92.68 7.31 92.68 7.31 
10 91.59 8.4 91.59 8.4 91.59 8.4 
Table 1: Classification of the Bank dataset 
Table 2: Classification of the Adult dataset 
dataset.attributes.	  




According to Table 3, we observed that QidD = 2 is the optimum case that increases the privacy gain as 
well as the NUE. Moreover, we can notice that the privacy level also increases when QidD value 
increases. The privacy gain reaches 91.59 % when the QidD is 10. On the other hand, the NUE decreases, 
and accordingly, the data utility decreases when QidD increases.  Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c demonstrate the 
selection of the best QidD for the Bank dataset by the proposed QIR algorithm on different k-anonymity 
values, 5, 15, and 25, respectively. In the bank dataset, the proposed algorithm the selected QIDs attributes 
are Work-class and Hours-per-week (HPW). These two attributes achieve the highest re-identification 



















To determines the best QidD in the Bank dataset track Table 4 and Fig. 6 (a, b, and c), it is clear that 
when QidD = 1 the proposed algorithm achieves the optimum case as it gives high privacy in several 
cases of k values. It can be also observed in Table 4 that the NUE drops from 45.28% when K=5 to 
Figure 5 (b): k = 15 
	  
Figure 5 (c): k = 25 
Figure 5: (a, b, and c). Best QidD selection for Bank dataset by QIR on different k values. 




17.27% when K increases above 15.  It is also noticeable in the Bank database that privacy decreases at 







































1 age 23.89 45.28 36.12 17.27 36.12 17.27 
2 age, job 21.83 36.65 21.83 36.65 21.83 36.65 
3 age, job, marital 15.83 40.35 16.67 37.18 17.94 32.37 
4 age, job, marital, education 14.88 35.93 14.88 35.93 16.43 29.26 
Figure 6 (c): k = 25 
Table 4: Experiments results for select the best QidD in Bank dataset	  
Figure 6 (a): k = 15 Figure 6 (b): k = 5 





Performance Benchmark and Discussion  
To evaluate the proposed QIR algorithm, we compare it with a recent based on k-anonymity against recent 
similar work SQI algorithm [37]. The comparison was conducted in terms of their  Privacy Gain (PG) 
and Non-uniform Entropy (NUE).  . Multiple 𝑘 values and different dataset sizes of the Adult will be 
used. In Figure 7 and Figure 8 . the privacy provided by QIR is more than the privacy achieved by SQI, 
where the improvement average exceeds 23%. Although SQI outperformed the QIR in data utility 
represented by NUE at k = 26, 29, 35, with a privacy rate of 9.57%, this is considered a deficiency because 













In Figures 9 and 10, it can be observed that at 10% of the dataset and k =10 the privacy achieved by the 
proposed QIR algorithm is more than double the privacy achieved by the SQI algorithm with slight 
increases in data utility. That is the proposed QIR algorithm outperforms the  SQI algorithm in terms of 
preserving privacy and data utility.  With data size, 20% and k = 20, the NUE obtained by SQI, QIR is 
30.27, 31.66 % respectively while the privacy given by SQI is 20.52% and by QIR is 51.82 which is twice 
time more than that is achieved by SQI. Similar results were obtained at k=20 and data size =30% and 
90%, respectively. In most cases, when data size increases the privacy decreases, and therefore the data 
utility increases.  
Figure 7: PG at several k values 
 
Dataset: Adult dataset 48842 tuple 
QidD of QIR = 2 (Work class, HPW) 
QidD of SQI = 1 (Age)	  
Figure 8: NUE at several k values 
 
Dataset: Adult dataset 48842 tuple 
QidD of QIR = 2 (work class, HPW) 




Generally, for the whole Adult data, results of the experiments at k = 10, and k=20 show that the average 
privacy percentage presented by SQI is 10.17% with 48.62% data utility, while the average privacy 
percentage offered by the proposed QIR is 46.49% with 41.04% data utility. As well for the whole Adult 
dataset and all K values experimented the average privacy provided by SQI is 7.51% against 54.13% data 
utility. While the average privacy percentage achieved by QIR is 30.67% against 55.46% data utility, 






Accurate Identification of QIDs is an important issue for the success and validity methods of privacy-
preserving outsourced data that seek to avoid privacy leakage caused by QIDs linking. This paper aims 
to classify dataset attributes before the anonymization process and determines the proper QIDs that should 
be involved in anonymity operation. A new algorithm is proposed based on the calculation of the re-
identification risk for dataset attributes to classify attributes to SAs, QIDs, and NSs based on pre-specified 
thresholds. In addition to attributes classification, the algorithm determines the actual dimension of QIDs 
that is required in the anonymization process depending on the amount of privacy provided versus a loss 
of the quality of the data. The experiment results indicated that the proposed identification algorithm has 
better performance and is more perfect in terms of privacy provided against data utility when compared 
with other work. Although the proposed algorithm is suitable to be used with any method or privacy 
model concerned with QIDs attributes, in this paper we have relied on the K-anonymity model. 
Figure 9: PG at several data sizes 
 
Dataset: Adult dataset 
QidD of QIR = 2 (workclass, HPW) 
QidD of SQI = 1 (Age) 
K = 10, 20 
Figure 10: NUE at several data sizes 
 
Dataset: Adult dataset 
QidD of QIR = 2 (workclass, HPW) 
QidD of SQI = 1 (Age) 






All data that used in this article are available in the machine learning repository at the University of 
California, Irvine (UCI): https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/. 
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